Александр Демин (Нью-Йоркский университет) представит работу “Why Does Persistence Happen (and Not)? A Model of Institutions and Culture in Long-Run Economic Development".
Приглашаем вас на Совместный семинар ЛИСОМО РЭШ и МЦИИР ВШЭ, объединенный с Семинаром НИУ ВШЭ по политической экономике.
Александр Демин (Нью-Йоркский университет) представит работу “Why Does Persistence Happen (and Not)? A Model of Institutions and Culture in Long-Run Economic Development".
Регистрация на семинар: до 12:00 21 января.
Аннотация:
Recent studies have convincingly shown that history matters for long-run development through various mechanisms whenever it is observed. What are the conditions for a decision to have persistent effects? I develop a theory of how formal political institutions and cultural transmission contribute to long-run effects. In the model, citizens select contributions to private and public goods, while the political elite decides on the expropriation and enforcement of public goods provision. The game is played in two periods with a stochastic social transformation occurring in between. First, the model shows how initially weak institutions contribute to the negative developmental effects. Second, the conditions for the persistence of cooperation on public goods with imperfect information are characterized. Importantly, transmission of beliefs works together with enforcing institutions, sustaining each other.