Научные публикации

Статья «Vote Suppression and Insecure Property Rights» default.published в Journal of Development Economics.

Авторы: , Paul Castaneda Dower, Tobias Pfutze. Journal of Development Economics (2015), Vol. 114, pp. 1–19

Аннотация

While it is commonly understood that land is a political tool, there is surprisingly little empirical research on how insecure property rights affect political outcomes. In this paper, we show how a dominant political party can use insecure property rights to ensure politically compliant voter behavior and how this power is frustrated after the introduction of a land certification program. We test this hypothesis on data covering 10,000 Mexican municipal elections during the country’s democratic transition. Exploiting the gradual rollout of a large-scale land certification program, we find that land titles significantly raised the number of votes for the main opposition parties. Importantly, this effect disappears once the dominant party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), has already lost at least one election in the municipality. These results provide an additional explanation of the PRI’s downfall and, more generally, illuminate the relationship between political power, institutions and resource allocation.

Статья «Экономические эффекты механизма совместного осуществления по сокращению атмосферных выбросов: пример Германии и России» default.published в Вестник Воронежского государственного университета.

Авторы: , Висмет Х., Мухамедрахимова Л. Н., Рожко А. О.. Вестник Воронежского государственного университета. Серия «Экономика и управление». 2014. № 3 (июль – сентябрь). С. 16–24

Аннотация

В статье обсуждаются экономические эффекты механизма совместного осуществления, реализуемого в рамках Киотского протокола, на примере двух активных участников – Германии и России. Приводится сравнительный анализ сходства и различия причин и способов участия стран в реализации данного механизма.

Статья «Economics and the Establishment of Stalinism» default.published в Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History (2014), Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 125-132.

Автор: Андрей Маркевич

Аннотация

After the collapse of communism, Soviet economic history remained a relatively small scholarly industry. Interest from other historians was limited because of skepticism regarding both the validity of the rational-choice approach employed by economic historians and the quality of data available to verify the approach.1 Students of Soviet history preferred to concentrate on political and social issues, taking advantage of the opening of the archives of the Soviet state. Yet declassified files on the Soviet economy remain largely underexplored; Gregory and Harrison have appraised the progress of work in this field, which in my view deserves more attention from historians as well as further development.2 I welcome the present discussion of Soviet economic history in Kritika and am grateful to the editors for the opportunity to take part in it. Before taking a careful look at the articles contributed to this issue, I will comment on what I consider the state of the art in the field of Soviet economic history and suggest contributions that further research in this vein could make to the understanding of Stalinism, Soviet history in general, and the nature of modern dictatorships.

Статья «An Equilibrium Model with Mixed Federal Structures» default.published в Izvestiya Irkutskogo Gos. Universiteta, 2014.

Авторы: , Makarov V. L., Savvateev A. V.

Аннотация

This paper examines the problem of meeting an inelastic demand for public goods of club type in an economy with a finite number of agents, who exhibit different preferences regarding the choice of public projects. The choice problem is assumed to be multidimensional as there are several dimensions of a societal decision.

From the formal point of view, the problem can be summarized as follows. There are n players, identified by points in a multidimensional space, who should be partitioned into a finite number of groups under the requirement that there exists no nonempty subset S of players, each member of which strictly prefers (in terms of utilities) group S to the group he was initially allocated.

Utilities which are inversely related to costs consist of two parts: monetary part (inversely proportional to the group’s size), and the transportation part (distance from the location of a player to the point minimizing aggregate transportation cost within his group).
One cannot hope for a general result of existence of stable coalition structure even in a uni-dimensional setting. However, by allowing formation of several coalition structures, each pursuing a different facet of public decision, we obtain a very general existence result. Formally, this means that for each coalition there exists a balanced system of weights assigned to each of the dimensions of the public project.

Статья «A History of Resistance to Privatization in Russia» default.published в Journal of comparative economics, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 855-873.

Авторы: Андрей Маркевич, Paul Castaneda Dower

Аннотация

We investigate the connection between privatization in post-communist Russia and a mass privatization reform in Imperial Russia, the 1906 Stolypin land reform. Specifically, we relate historical measures of conflicts associated with the Stolypin reform to contemporary views on whether the privatization of the 1990s should be revised. These historical measures could influence contemporary views in two ways: first, differences in privatization-related conflicts in the past could have directly altered attitudes towards privatization in the 1990s and, second, these differences could merely reflect pre-determined dissimilarities in preferences. We first show that historical measures of resistance to privatization are associated with views that favor state ownership. One standard deviation increase in the historical resistance to privatization explains a quarter of the negative sentiment toward private property today. We also find that negative experiences with the Stolypin reform are associated with views on the procedural unfairness of modern privatization reforms, suggesting that pre-determined preferences cannot fully explain the weight of history.